

## **Strategically partnering with power: Brazil, South Africa, and prospects for EU security and defence**

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*Over the course of the past two decades, unprecedented events and developments coupled with a shift in the global balance of power have raised the question of the EU's role as an actor internationally. The recent U.S. strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific casts doubts about the future of the transatlantic link, and requires from the EU to endorse a more active role in the promotion of peace and stability worldwide. Although the Lisbon Treaty has created the incentives for the improvement of the Union's external actions' efficiency and coherence, sustained pressures over national defence budgets and EU military capabilities are currently challenging the EU's ability to take on such a role. Is the EU in measure of projecting its power and values autonomously? Along what other countries could the Union reposition itself? Increased political dialogue amongst emerging powers in the recent years has reflected their common desire and willingness to play a prominent role in world affairs. In particular, South Africa and Brazil differ from the other BRICS, in that their political systems and multilateralism and human rights concerns are aligned with those of the EU. Additionally, they share a more positive perception of the EU's role as a security actor. Focusing on these countries, this paper intends to assess how their "emerging power" could serve the purpose of advancing the EU's foreign policy goals and security objectives. Precedents of operational contribution to EU-led operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework, if limited, serve as indications of the potential for new lines of cooperation.*

### Introduction

The changes in the global balance of power and the recent U.S. strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific have exerted sustained pressure for the EU to take on a leading role in international peace and security.<sup>1</sup> Although the Lisbon Treaty has created the incentives for the improvement of the Union's external actions' efficiency and coherence, strained national defence budgets and limited EU military capabilities are currently putting into question the EU's ability to endorse such a role. In parallel, the general recognition of the existence or 'emergence' of other powers that share a common desire and willingness to play a prominent role in world affairs, has translated into mixed feelings. If, on the one hand, 'emerging powers' represent a great potential for supporting the advancement of the EU's foreign policy goals and security objectives in the world, these countries' own agendas, on the other hand, may clash with that of the EU.

In this perspective, the EU's signing of so-called strategic partnerships with emerging powers is inscribed in the Union's efforts to promote channels of cooperation and dialogue while reducing possible friction. Although investing in relations with these countries was recognised as a top priority of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's move seems to be

a mere gesture to secure partners, rather than being directed towards a defined strategic end. Catherine Ashton's speech on EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers at the European Parliament in February 2012 revealed that exact lack of purpose; 'we need to do that [invest in strategic partnerships] because it is in our interest to do it'. But what exactly could these partners help the EU achieve?

As certain analysts have noted, these partnerships were established in a largely uncoordinated fashion, and with ill-defined objectives,<sup>2</sup> a flaw which is, indeed, all the more tangible in the areas of security and defence. From that point of view, this paper suggests that the vagueness of the goals and objectives specified in the partnerships reflect a broader issue; the lack of coherent EU defence and security strategy. The 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 report of implementation do not spell out proper strategic courses of action but rather define the major threats faced by the EU and reassert the principles upon which European action abroad should be based.<sup>3</sup> If the institutional framework as defined by the Lisbon Treaty has consolidated the tools for the advancement of the Union's foreign policy, mainly through the newly founded EEAS, an essential priority that remains is to define how these will be, paraphrasing Liddell Hart, distributed and applied to fulfil the ends of policy.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the EEAS, now, has the ability to render the Union's partnerships with emerging countries truly strategic. In this context, the partnerships with Brazil and South Africa can be identified as two that have the potential of enhancing the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in terms of the accrual of new and interoperable military resources and political will.

In broader political terms, South Africa and Brazil differ from the other BRICS in four essential aspects that align them with the EU's behaviour; their commitment to democracy, their view of the international order and the promotion of multilateralism, their understanding of stability and security as inextricably linked to socio-economic development and finally their concern with the promotion and protection of human rights. In addition, although the EU has not clearly defined its geopolitical area of interest (with the exception of its 'neighbourhood'), a quick look at CSDP missions and operations deployed so far identifies Africa and the Middle East as main focus points. At the same time, South Africa and Brazil openly define a common interest in the development, the stability and the security of the African continent. Furthermore, these two countries explicitly consider defence as a policy tool which, in turn, requires the consolidation of a strong defence industrial base adapted to the foreign policy goals they intend to achieve. At this level EU Member States play a key role in building up Brazil's and South Africa's industrial complex through arms procurement, transfer of capabilities and knowledge and technological sharing. Finally, these countries have contributed to peacekeeping, verification and security sector reform missions, under the flagship of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the African Union (AU), in a clear alignment with the EU's action in the world. If there is only one precedent of operational contribution of these countries to EU-led missions within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, previously European Security Defence Policy ESDP) framework,<sup>5</sup> Brazil and South Africa have often been working closely or alongside EU missions or EU Member States in diverse theatres. If

limited, these similar, sometimes parallel, involvements serve as indications of the potential for new lines of cooperation and for the refinement of the EU's security and defence strategy.

Drawing on these premises, this paper intends to assess how Brazil's and South Africa's 'emerging power' could serve the purpose of advancing the EU's foreign policy goals and security objectives in the framework of CSDP. Looking into the current state of these countries' security and defence thinking and the strategies they developed in recent years, the opportunities and challenges ahead of a stronger cooperation with Brazil and South Africa will be analysed. What implications would further cooperation involve for the defence and security thinking of the European Union? Could an enhanced strategic partnership pave the way for the formulation of more coherent and integrated European strategy? These are some of the fundamental questions this paper will engage with.

### **I. Giving sense to the concept of 'strategic partnerships': the approach to strategy as an analytical method**

Due to its over-use, the concept of strategy has lost part of its explanatory value. In this sense, by way of clarification, it is necessary to begin this paper with some conceptual remarks to appreciate what the term really entails, and how to approach its study in order to shed light on the behaviour of political actors in the international scene. In the words of Michael Howard, the subject matter of strategy essentially involves the analysis of the 'use of available resources to gain any objective', where the notion of resources implies diverse means, material and immaterial, for the attainment of desired political ends.<sup>6</sup> Howard's appreciation of the concept corresponded to the idea that strategy was not only concerned with the use of military means in war, a view which gained ascendancy since the end of the Second World War. This understanding broke with the rigidity of the definition of Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz who had presented it as the 'use of battles to achieve the aim of war'.<sup>7</sup> In international affairs, strategy is still deeply concerned with the way political actors use or threaten to use force, and with how they combine it with other means like diplomacy, economic power, propaganda, and so forth to impose their will on others or to strike a bargain.

A key feature of strategy, is that the 'ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependant to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make'.<sup>8</sup> In other words, in the process of deciding how to employ the means available for the attainment of given ends, the political actor has to take into account the views of others, be them opponents or partners, as his actions will elicit a response from them. This key feature is known as interdependency, and was already present in Clausewitz's first principles, who noted that in war, the opponent is never an abstract person but someone who makes choices and takes decisions. Thus one's own course of action will depend on what one considers the actions of the other will be. In this sense, it is the requirement of taking the response of a reasoning adversary into account that makes the process of strategic formulation a difficult one, specifically with regard to the degree in which the goals will be attainable through the means selected.<sup>9</sup>

The feature of interdependency implies that political actors that think strategically have a rational behaviour. This means that they calculate the advantages of a particular course of action according to a consistent value system.<sup>10</sup> The study of strategy, however, does not consider actors to be perfectly rational and fully efficient in maximising benefits. Conversely, it parts from the idea that rationality is bounded, and simply denotes, in the words of Uruguayan economist Francisco López-Alves, that ‘an actor’s decisions are made after careful cost-benefit calculation, and the means chosen seem optimal to accomplish the desired end’.<sup>11</sup> This notion of rationality means, on one part, that the measure of the anticipated costs of using the means available is consistent to the anticipated benefits, and on the other, that the motivations and values that structure the ends sought are consistent with the means selected to achieve them.<sup>12</sup>

In general, the notions of interdependency and rationality help to appreciate better the functioning of strategy, and how to approach its study to comment on the behaviour of political actors. This is, in Thomas Schelling’s words, ‘[t]he art of looking at the problem from the other’s point of view, identifying his opportunities and his interests’.<sup>13</sup> Succinctly, this all means that in order to define a strategic course of action, it is essential to analyse the decisions others will take to reach their own ends, and to envisage how they intend to employ the means available. The study of strategy, therefore, implies assessing if the motivations and intentions of the political actor are consistent with the ends selected, and with the effort and the means employed to achieve them.

Understanding these essential features of the dynamics of strategy can serve to give more sense to the concept of ‘strategic partnerships’. Moreover, this semantic clarification serves the purpose of defining what a truly strategic partnership would entail for the EU, as for the moment the Union is still short of a common understanding; ‘Strategic partnerships are a political category that no EU document or statement clearly defines’.<sup>14</sup> If the concept of ‘strategic partnerships’ is overly debated amongst EU analysts, this paper’s aim is not to balance the ‘strategic’ against the ‘partnership’ part of the concept nor to privilege one aspect over the other. Rather, it parts from the premise that these partnerships exist, and argues that some of them could be given a real strategic dimension.

Building up the EU’s capacity to tackle common threats was, from the onset, one of the central motivations behind the conclusion of partnerships with other actors around the world. The 2003 European Security Strategy had stated that the threats faced by the EU were ‘common threats, shared with all our closest partners. [...] We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors’<sup>15</sup> although the emphasis on strategic partnerships with emerging powers only came in the 2008 Report of Implementation. It was finally given a clear impulse by Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton in 2010, who elevated partnerships to an EU foreign policy priority. As suggested by the 2003 and 2008 documents and by the President of the Council, a focal point for a strategic partner relates to its pivotal capacity to tackle common threats alongside the EU on the global stage.

With the above definition of strategy in mind, a truly strategic partner would, thus, be an actor who would play a determining role in enabling the EU to achieve its ends with regard to the international system. Whether the partner in question is pursuing a shared goal, or whether, by way of interdependency, he may gain an advantage in supporting the EU's efforts, the strategic character of a partnership lies in its instrumentality. Yet, as some authors have noted the instrumental and result-oriented approach is framed by 'the presence of *common values, common interests and mutual understanding* [that] are essential criteria for a "partnership"'.<sup>16</sup> If partnerships and cooperation can be envisaged between actors with different sets of principles and values, the possibility of making these partnerships truly strategic is rather unlikely.

In this sense, it is doubtful that the European Union, as a normative power overly concerned with the consistency of value systems and with a distinctive approach to global security, could ever develop a real strategic partnership with unlike-minded countries.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, divides between them and the EU would be unavoidable, if not in the definition of shared ends, they would undoubtedly rise in the selection of the means and efforts required to achieve desired ends. This was stated by the 2003 ESS which argued that the EU 'should look to develop strategic partnerships, with [...] all those who share [its] goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support'.<sup>18</sup> The existence and importance of shared values was further emphasised in the Union's individual strategic partnerships with Brazil and South Africa as a necessary prerequisite; the shared values included democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, basic economic principles of social market economy and free trade as well as a shared agenda of promoting peace and stability, governance, democratisation and economic growth in their respective regions. Moreover, by mentioning 'partnerships for effective multilateralism',<sup>19</sup> the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS suggested the Union's concern with multilateral cooperation in its bilateral engagement and partnerships.

Yet, whereas the EU has explicitly defined the values that guide its actions within its territory and around the world, it is far less vocal with regard to formulating clear foreign policy objectives and setting up a strategy to attain them. Indeed, if the formulation of a strategy appears to be an increasingly challenging task within the current interconnected international framework, it is all the more complicated when it comes to a hybrid political entity encompassing conflicting national interests, such as the EU. The differential character of the strategic partnerships that have so far been concluded by the EU, whether in terms of shared values and principles, converging interests or long-term consistency and rationale, reflects this exact lack of strategic thinking on the EU's part. The Union's strategic partnerships have been erroneously conceived so as to become an end in themselves, instead of turning out to be a reliable foreign policy tool. 'Partnerships do not become strategic by virtue of defining them as such'<sup>20</sup> and in that perspective, the EU needs to undergo a serious reflection to identify not only its main interests and objectives but also the means to pursue them more assertively. Yet, when looking at the regional level and at more specific policy areas, crisis prevention and management in Africa has proved a focal point of EU foreign policy. It is here where it appears that regional powers such as Brazil and South Africa have the potential to support the EU's efforts to address issues of common pressing concern. If the strategic partnerships with

these countries already exist conceptually, this paper considers that there is ground to make them truly strategic in action.

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For the purposes of this paper, the lineaments of the dynamics of strategy that have been discussed, and how they should reflect on the existing strategic partnerships, allows to examine in a systematic fashion the process of security and defence strategic formulation of South Africa and Brazil. That is, it helps assess how the motivations, intentions and preferences have translated into specific foreign policy goals, and how they shape the selection of means to attain them. By doing this, it will be possible to chart the aspects and areas (either functional or geographic) where opportunities exist for the EU to refine its own strategic thinking.

## **II. The state of defence and security thinking in Brazil and South Africa**

If the first BRICS Summit Declarations essentially focused on fostering economic and financial cooperation and policy coordination, during the later ones, BRICS countries became increasingly vocal of their common desire and willingness to play a prominent role in world affairs. This was recently reasserted in the Fifth BRICS Summit Declaration and Action Plan on March 27<sup>th</sup> 2013 where the countries declared: ‘We are committed to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity and reaffirm that the 21st century should be marked by peace, security, development, and cooperation. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries’.<sup>21</sup> Such intentions to play a leading role in regional stability and international peace, security and development are clearly reflected in Brazil’s and South Africa’s national defence policies.<sup>22</sup> It is in this perspective that both countries recently underwent a revision process of their strategies. Their respective Defence Review (second draft 2012)<sup>23</sup> and National Defence White book (2012) are synchronised with the spirit and statement of principles of the BRICS, and translate these intentions into concrete national security and defence goals, whilst defining the roles and missions of their armed forces. (See Annexes B and C)

The following section presents, in a systematic way, the commonalities in South Africa’s and Brazil’s current defence strategies. Four common themes have been identified as critical for the purpose of this study, namely, South Africa’s and Brazil’s regional agenda, their reliance on the development/security nexus, their commitment to multilateral structures and peacekeeping, and their interest in pursuing defence industry cooperation. These elements are summarised in Annex A.

### South Africa’s Defence Review

South Africa’s Defence Review of 2012 comes to review and update the existing White Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Review (1998), the Defence Act (2002) and the defence policy as premised in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act. N° 108 of 1996).

A primary goal is 'to ensure continued relevance and legislative compliance' of these foundations of South Africa's national policy on defence.<sup>24</sup> A Review Committee was appointed to 'identify defence objectives and specify defence functions, and pronounce on the strategic defence posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances and security institutions or mechanisms that will govern operations on the defence force'.<sup>25</sup> The Committee undertook a reflection over the capabilities and force levels needed, and the subsequent doctrine and industry requirements in order to meet present and future commitments. The Defence Review, thus, encompasses a broad, cross-cutting and independent long-term perspective (with a focus up to the next 30 years) on the trajectory of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in order to map out the path to reach these objectives.

In the absence of immediate conventional threat to the state, South Africa identifies its main threats and sources of insecurity to be of developmental and human security nature. In this sense, the Defence Force is perceived 'as a key national asset [...] to carry out directed actions to support national development', and alignment between the fields of development and defence is ensured through the parallel formulation of the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Defence Review.<sup>26</sup> South Africa also views a peaceful and stable environment as conducive to development, security and sustainable growth, and as a necessary precondition for the achievement of its policy objectives. The government, consequently, sees South African security as inextricably linked to that of its region, the draft Defence Review stating that 'Africa is at the Centre of South Africa's policy'.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the Defence Review clearly asserts the country's need to pull its weight beyond its borders, in order to tackle the sources of insecurity that stem from its unstable regional context, an approach which is similar to the EU's policy towards its neighbourhood.

As a regional power, a leader of Pan-Africanism and a promoter of an African renaissance, South Africa considers that it has a responsibility to contribute and support the advancement and integration of the continent and strives for its unity, integration and prosperity, most specifically in Southern Africa. In that respect, it promotes regional and continental cooperation and partnerships, within the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Defence Review states that 'South Africa will continue to champion the role of the AU as the primary organisation for coordinating continental positions with development partners'.<sup>28</sup> With South African diplomat Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected as Chair of the AU's Commission, the country will undoubtedly strengthen its engagement of the organisation's mechanisms such as the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee. Finally, South Africa is a major actor in leading the development and integration of the SADC, especially in the field of defence. With the SADC's Mutual Defence Pact having been signed in August 2003, the Defence Review aims at pursuing initiatives 'to create a firm SADC defence and security sector foundation'.<sup>29</sup>

In its role of regional leader, South Africa strongly supports collective actions within multilateral organisations in order to sketch out adequate and lasting solutions to problems that transcend its borders. The country has been increasingly involved in various multilateral security structures and peacekeeping missions of the African Union and the United Nations

across the African continent. (see Annex D) Indeed, South Africa is committed to multilateral action within the framework of the United Nations Charter. It is also committed 'to the common values of democracy, human rights, peace and stability, and civil control of the armed forces'<sup>30</sup> and envisages defence partnerships only with like-minded states. It builds its strategy as primarily relying firstly on political, economic and military cooperation, secondly on prevention, management and resolution of conflict through nonviolent means, whereas the threat of the use of force or the use of force itself are last resorts. Although recognising the principle of non-interference and the commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict, the use of military force may take place in extreme circumstances where all attempts at a peaceful resolution have failed, and 'as far as possible, [...] within a multinational framework'.<sup>31</sup> The Defence Review, indeed, states that South Africa would consider contributing to:

- interventions under grave circumstances
- peace missions and post-conflict development
- reconstruction of the security sector (SSR)
- regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- general military assistance missions
- regional security initiatives, such as maritime security and anti-piracy operations.<sup>32</sup>

It is in this spirit, that South Africa is currently engaged in the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Darfur.

A great amount of South Africa's defence purchases comes from European sources. If South Africa had begun developing a strong industrial base under the apartheid regime, the return of democracy triggered a change in defence policy. The government opted for external procurement, mainly from European industries, such as the 1999 \$11billion Strategic Defence Procurement which involved the controversial purchase of sophisticated military hardware from Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK.<sup>33</sup> South Africa has recently been refocusing on developing an industrial base, with a particular focus on sophisticated technologies, and through the conclusion of partnerships with European firms such as Eurocopter, SAAB, and BAE System.<sup>34</sup> Whilst South Africa's military power can be considered as trivial when compared to those of the other BRICS, both in terms of defence spending and defence industry, it remains the most important one of Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>35</sup>

Taking into consideration South Africa's perception of international security, the Defence Review concludes that 'effective defence capabilities [...] include a defence industry to support the Defence Force, granting a valuable measure of strategic independence'.<sup>36</sup> To that end, the Defence Review clearly provides for Government involvement and financial and political support to the defence industry, including in terms of assistance with the international marketing of armaments of domestic defence industry. In addition, as part of its Pan-African agenda and advocacy for South-South solidarity, South Africa has been promoting defence industry cooperation within the SADC region, but also with other emerging powers. Interoperability at the operational and tactical levels is, indeed, a major motivation. During the latest BRICS Summit in Durban in South Africa, the defence sector was brought to the forth, with Defence and Military Veterans Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-



Nqakula advocating for increased synergies and enhanced cooperation amongst the BRICS which could be included in the formal BRICS structures in the future. A number of collaborative ventures in the defence sector are already underway with the countries of the BRICS, notably with the important fifth generation air-to-air missile programme developed as a joint venture between South Africa and Brazil.<sup>37</sup>

### Brazil's National Defence White Book

In July 2012, Dilma Rousseff's government presented to Congress the first National Defence White book in Brazil's history, to announce the defence posture of the country. This document, together with the 2012 reviews of the National Defence Strategy (2008) and the National Defence Policy (2005), represents a major advance in Brazilian strategic thinking, particularly in the existence of a more coherent and integrated work between the foreign and defence ministries, from which the documents stem. Concretely, in the White Book, the Brazilian government asserts that it needs to develop a military instrument that corresponds to the country's economic, political and strategic stature, and that serves an 'essential component for its affirmative and cooperative insertion in the international level.'<sup>38</sup> In this respect, Brazil effectively links its defence policy to its wider revisionist foreign policy agenda, focused on the construction of 'cooperative multi-polarity' and the promotion of multilateral processes.

Whilst several security and defence concerns are listed in the White Book, including international terrorism, biopiracy, cyberwarfare and possible tensions over natural resources, Brazil gives priority to a potential foreign, extra regional interference in its territory and in its region of influence. Brazil does not feel threatened by its neighbours in the continent; rather it is concerned with the protection of their respective sovereignties as it is of its own. In this sense, Brazil's defence strategy gives crucial importance to furthering cooperation with the region, viewing in its political integration and socioeconomic development key elements to guarantee not only its stability but to enhance its world ascendancy. As in the South African case, Brazil sees a clear link between its defence policy and the promotion of development, as the latter is perceived as a means for 'maintaining relationships of friendship and cooperation, based on confidence and mutual trust with neighbouring countries'.<sup>39</sup>

A crucial aspect of the White Paper is that it has made explicit the country's geopolitical zone of interest in which the country intends to take on a leading regional role. This zone is composed of South America and the South Atlantic including the western coast of Africa. Brazil envisages using its leverage with the purpose of fomenting economic development and political integration in South America with the aim of consolidating a 'community of peace and security'.<sup>40</sup> Currently, there is a clear interest from Brazil to work towards the strengthening of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which was constituted in 2008, and which aims at the creation of a community of nations on the model of the EU.

For its part, the South Atlantic is understood by Brazil not only as a maritime strategic corridor that requires attention, but also as an intercontinental space that serves as a vital commercial route and point of contact with West Africa, where it aims to extend its international prominence. Currently, the main international mechanism through which Brazil

engages with its western African 'neighbours' is the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), formed in 1986 from an initiative of Brazil at the U.N General Assembly. ZOPACAS brings together ministers from 24 countries of South America and Africa with coasts in the South Atlantic, to create a space for political dialogue at the South-South level and foment peace and security in the area. The further development of the ZOPACAS initiative is considered by Brazil in its White paper as an important foreign policy aim to pursue, as to enhance the country's involvement in multilateral processes and maintain an official space of dialogue with a number of countries with which it has increased diplomatic, economic and even military contact in the past two decades.<sup>41</sup> Such is the close relationship Brazil has established with Africa, that the Itamaraty confirmed last year that it's number of diplomatic representations in that continent is higher than the UK's.<sup>42</sup>

Due to Africa's geostrategic importance, Brazil is clearly concerned with the continents' stability, and with the development of its western African partners within the ZOPACAS initiative. In this sense, it is worthy to note that Brazil is an important purveyor of technical and humanitarian aid for, but not only, Western African countries, especially for cooperation initiatives in the fight against poverty and hunger. Conversely, it has also initiated technical cooperation in defence, including a programme for the formation of the Namibian Navy, which includes equipment procurement and personnel training, and the joint missile development venture with South Africa. Indeed, as a report from Chatham House recently stated, Brazil's current multi-level engagement with Africa, is a centrepiece of its strategy to gain support for its foreign policy ambitions, including the desire to win a seat at the U.N Security Council.<sup>43</sup>

Given Brazil's ambitions to create force projection capabilities to play a more transcendental role in world affairs the development of its defence industrial is perceived as a key strategic goal. The acquisition of industrial autonomy for the development and procurement of indispensable defence technologies is considered the main objective. Three areas of strategic importance have been identified by the National Defence Strategy where there should be industrial developments: space, cybernetic and nuclear. It is the latter which deserves increased focus, in the White Book, particularly with the development of a nuclear propelled submarine. With these areas in mind is that Brazil considers essential to optimise the acquisition of technology from the most developed countries. At the same time, it considers the need to strengthen military cooperation with its partners of the BRICS forum, but especially with its South American partners. Indeed, Brazil sees the South American Defence Council at UNASUR as a vehicle to increase military cooperation in the region and build the basis for the development of an integrated defence industry. As the country with the most developed industrial base in the region, Brazil perceives it can take a leading role in pursuing increased integration in this area. The White Book is, in this sense, explicit in stating the advantages of having South America behaving as a block in defence industry matters, as it would create shared military capabilities for dissuading foreign aggression, but also, it will aggregate to reinforce Brazil's power of negotiation in international forums.<sup>44</sup>

Brazil has played an increasingly active role, leading and supporting various peacekeeping missions around the globe (see Annex D), and which are considered to be compatible to the geopolitical stature of the country. Indeed, as an emerging power with regional and global ambitions, Brazil's White Book has asserted the country's aims to enhance its contribution to such peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions under U.N mandate. In this sense, the capabilities for military power projection the country intends to acquire are openly aiming to this precise goal.<sup>45</sup> So far, the best illustration of Brazil's participation in peacekeeping has been its leadership and commitment to the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti since 2004.

This particular case is also an example of the way Brazil understands the limits of peacekeeping operations under U.N mandate. Following the principle of non-intervention, Brazil sustains these are not supposed to 'substitute the parts of a conflict', as the U.N needs to act impartially to maintain its legitimacy and political value.<sup>46</sup> In this sense, the White Paper reasserts that Brazil considers that 'peacekeeping operations must be sustained under four elements: security, institutional strengthening, national reconciliation and development', and finding an equilibrium between these is a priority for Brazil in terms of revising the guidance for this type of missions at the UN.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, Brazil supports a broader view of peacekeeping operations, going beyond the sole application of force, and which is consistent with the EU's comprehensive approach. Brazil's commitment to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has led to the promotion of cooperation initiatives in food and health, education and infrastructure development. In this sense, the White Book sustains that Brazil will tend to increase civilian participation in these sorts of mission, to fulfil the demand for qualified personnel to work on a wide range of areas including SSR.

Brazil and South Africa have been constantly aspiring for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, advocating for the improvement of the working methods of the Security Council in order to make it more legitimate, representative and effective.<sup>48</sup> In parallel, they have been increasingly critical of the limits of peacebuilding and of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has served as ground for interventions in third states' internal conflicts. In the case of Libya, Brazil, South Africa and the rest of the BRICS have expressed their disagreement with the implementation of the principle of R2P, which was perceived as an infringement of sovereignty and as a premature use of force where all other means had not been exhausted. The issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict was central to Brazil's subsequent proposal of a "Responsibility While Protecting" (RWP). Without putting into question the three pillars upon which the principle of R2P is articulated, RWP suggests a political subordination and chronological sequencing aiming at clarifying the conditions under which intervention can take place and at limiting the use of force.

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The four elements analysed in this section (regional agenda, development/security nexus, commitment to multilateral structures, defence industry cooperation) have illustrated the unity of purpose and goals of South Africa and Brazil. They have also highlighted the existing multilateral initiatives in which both are involved to advance their own policy agendas in

security and defence. Their shared similar political systems, their unequivocal commitment to multilateralism and universal values, their clear support for international security through the development of crisis management tools, and their late efforts to build up their own capabilities and to engage into defence cooperation through regional or global initiatives, are all relevant areas for the strengthening of their security and defence interaction with the EU.

### **III. Conclusions: South Africa, Brazil, and prospects for EU security and defence**

Since its inception, the EU has been seeking to promote peace, prosperity, and security, firstly in the European continent, and later on, in and beyond its neighbourhood. The 1990s Balkan wars were decisive for the EU's development of crisis management structures and capabilities. Indeed, the EU's inability to take action to stop a decade of violence in its immediate surroundings led to the setting up, at the EU Cologne Summit of June 1999, of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As stated in the St. Malo Declaration, the European Union 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.<sup>49</sup> Based on the Petersberg Tasks as defined in Bonn in June 1992, the ESDP was aimed to cover:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks
- conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking

This range of tasks came to be complemented by joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty also changed the denomination of ESDP into "Common Security and Defence Policy" (CSDP). CSDP is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 'aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management'.<sup>50</sup> As one of its major elements and policies, the CSDP covers defence and military aspects, as well as the civilian dimension of the EU's external action.

The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 was a landmark development in defining the Union's strategic environment and strategic objectives. This document defines the series of future security issues that can pose a threat to the EU. In particular, the EU is concerned with the impact of possible state failure and regional conflicts in Africa and the Middle East.<sup>51</sup> Although it is recognised that the EU privileges the use of a mixture of political and economic instruments and other coercive measures to attain its foreign policy goals, the ESS admits that failed states and regional conflicts may require military force to restore order and tackle immediate crises. The 'comprehensive approach' is, indeed, a key element in the EU's approach to crisis management, which aims horizontally, at mobilising a wide range of tools and instruments (political, economic, diplomatic, military

etc.), and vertically, at covering the different stages of a crisis situation from prevention, through intervention and management, to reconstruction.

In the strategy, the EU asserts that security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on an effective multilateral system; hence, ‘the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’ is considered an essential objective.<sup>52</sup> It is in this perspective that the EU decided to foster partnerships and alliances with third countries. As it was presented at the onset of this paper, the driving element behind the conclusion of partnerships is the consistency with the EU’s value systems, the commitment to multilateral actions in full respect of the UN Charter, and the existence of common objectives.

However, given that the EU is a hybrid political entity with no single sovereignty, its complex institutional setup and its Member States’ conflicting positions and interests in foreign policy matters, severely affect the EU’s ability to translate existing will into action. The consensus-based decision-making process within the EU Council, indeed, constitutes a first barrier that ensures that only missions and operations of shared interest and concern amongst all Member States can be deployed. Although the Lisbon Treaty aimed at enhancing the Union’s capacity to speak with one voice with the creation of the EEAS and the post of the High Representative for Foreign Policy, Member States remain the ones with seats within multilateral structures such as the UN Security Council. Moreover, as the EU’s military capabilities are built up by contributions from its Member States whose defence budgets are under strained pressure due to the financial crisis, its ability to project power beyond its borders is increasingly limited. Setting up, funding, leading, coordinating and sustaining CSDP missions autonomously in remote countries becomes challenging, as was noted by Hansjörg Haber, Civilian Operations Commander and Director of the EEAS’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).<sup>53</sup> Indeed, it is in this area that emerging powers could play a more important role, as they could work hand in hand with the EU for the execution of missions and operations in locations of common interest.

Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) have already been signed with 12 countries.<sup>54</sup> In addition, discussions were recently put into place for the signature of an FPA to facilitate Brazil’s involvement in EU missions and operations in the framework of the strategic partnership. ‘In the international scene, Brazil and the EU share common values, strategic objectives and their commitment to multilateral diplomacy’.<sup>55</sup> This public statement summarises the EU’s prerequisites for admitting third states as allies; consistency with EU values, strategic objectives, and commitment to multilateral structures.

The analysis of South Africa’s and Brazil’s postures in the previous part of this paper has revealed these states’ similar world views, definition of goals and selection of means. Thus, it is possible to suggest that South Africa could equally be considered as a key partner for more systematic support to CSDP missions and operations. On this ground, these countries have the potential of becoming truly strategic partners as they could sustain EU’s efforts to address issues of common pressing concern. The EU, South Africa and Brazil aim to promote good

governance and human rights, assist development and address the root causes of conflict. Strategic partnerships are already in place. There is common willingness to contribute to international peace and stability, in particular in Africa, based on the inclusion of civilian and military instruments. Brazil and South Africa have developed an advanced strategic thinking that relates adequate instruments to the achievement of foreign policy ends. Operational precedents exist with South Africa's and Brazil's support to Operation Artemis in DRC. When participation is not direct, there is cooperation as part of different multilateral organisations. Finally, military equipment is interoperable, facilitated by considerable procurement from EU countries. Hence, these emerging powers' booming economies, growing defence spending, and decisive political will could balance the current limitations imposed on EU capacities. (See Annex E)

If there is ground for furthering cooperation, several questions and points of contention arise as regards Brazil's and South Africa's own views of the EU. Firstly, is the EU a strategic partner that would help them advancing their own foreign policy goals? For example, will there be an EU positive common response to these countries' ambitions of gaining a seat at the UN Security Council? Secondly, there is a degree of suspicion from South Africa and Brazil vis-à-vis the EU and the established powers in general, which has translated into non alignment and into the privileging of new forums like the BRICS. Conflicting views around key issues may appear and hinder cooperation, for example due to Brazil's and South Africa's commitment to non-intervention and their reformulation of the Responsibility to Protect into the Responsibility While Protecting.

On the part of these emerging powers, there are also issues that limit their ability to take an active role in CSDP. For example, whilst Brazil's aspiration to create force-projection capabilities and to work under the framework of multilateralism for the preservation of international peace and security, the role that the country can take on at the moment is still fairly limited. As former President Lula stated just before leaving office in 2010, Brazil is a country 'without important means to project military power internationally, and cannot aspire to be a full actor globally [...] it is a mistake to think that Brazil, merely because it owns vast territory, abundant natural resources and numerous population, will automatically have a relevant role in the international sphere'.<sup>56</sup>

The possibilities for making strategic defence and security partnerships with Brazil and South Africa concrete are constrained by the EU's own lack of strategic thinking in these fields. Calls for a renewed European Security Strategy have been increasingly voiced by policy-makers and analysts alike. If such a review takes place, the EU's strategic formulation could pave the way towards an optimisation of its existing partnerships and direct them towards the achievement of common international security goals. Conversely, engaging more actively with Brazil and South Africa in the context of the existing partnerships, with the aim of increasing cooperation and participation in the security field may in return, lead to a concrete alignment of the partnerships with a coherent and integrated European strategy.

## Annex A: Common foreign and defence policy themes of South Africa and Brazil


Advanced Strategic thinking: definition of objectives and means to achieve them  
 → South African Defence Review and Brazilian White Paper 2012  
 → Common defence & security objectives and goals  
 Revisionist foreign policy

Themes	South Africa	Brazil
<b>Regional agenda</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promotion of regional forums</li> <li>- Relations with neighbours: positive and constructive, engagement with the neighbourhood</li> </ul>	<p>Yes: NEPAD, SADC, AU, BRICS, IBSA, Africa-South America Summit</p> <p>Yes: Africa's development and stability as necessary for development and security in South Africa</p>	<p>Yes: UNASUR, Celac, MERCOSUR, BRICS, IBSA, Africa-South America Summit, ZOPACAS</p> <p>Yes: Promotion of political and economic integration of South America. Engages positively with partners in West Africa</p>
<b>Development/security nexus and security provider role</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- View of socioeconomic development initiatives as key drivers of security and stability</li> <li>- View of use of force as last resort</li> </ul>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p>
<b>Commitment to multilateral structures and peacekeeping</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Commitment to respect of multilateralism</li> <li>- international security agenda</li> <li>- Contribution to multilateral peacekeeping</li> </ul>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p>
<b>Defence industry</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Connection between foreign and policy goals and development of defence</li> </ul>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes</p>


<p>industry</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Investment in R&amp;T for their industrial base</li> <li>- Multilateral Defence cooperation intentions</li> <li>- Defence integration with EU sources</li> <li>- Bilateral defence cooperation.</li> </ul>	<p>Not much compared to rest of the BRICS but the most of Sub-Saharan Africa</p> <p>Yes: within SADC, AU, BRICS</p> <p>Yes: With France and UK industries.</p> <p>Yes: A-Dart air-to-air missile programme</p>	<p>Yes: Especially in cybernetic; space and nuclear areas.</p> <p>Yes: within CDS and BRICS</p> <p>Yes: With France in aero industry and submarine technology development</p> <p>Yes: A-Dart air-to-air missile programme</p>
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## Annex B: Pertinent National Defence strategic objectives of South Africa



## Annex C: Pertinent National Defence strategic objectives of Brazil



## Annex D: South Africa and Brazil contributions to Peacekeeping operations

### South Africa's Contribution to multilateral missions and operations since 2003

Acronym	Mission name	Location	Start date of mission	Year of contribution	End of contribution
MONUC (SCR 1279) transformed into MONUSCO (SCR 1925)	UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo (Democratic Republic of the, DRC)	30/11/1999	1999	- to present
UNMEE (SCR 1312)	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Eritrea, Ethiopia	1/07/2000	2000	2008
SAPSD (Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi)	South African Protection and Support Detachment	Burundi	1/11/2001	2001	
UNAMA (SCR 1401)	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1/03/2002	2002	2010
UNMIL (SCR 1509)	UN Missions in Liberia	Liberia	1/10/2003	2003	2005
AMIB (AU 3/02/2003)	African Mission in Burundi	Burundi	1/04/2003	2003	2004
Operation Artemis (CJA 2003/423/CFSP)	EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo (Democratic Republic of the, DRC)	1/06/2003	2003	2003
MIOC (AU 30/01/2004)	AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros	Comoros	1/03/2004	2004	2004
AMIS (AU 28/05/2004) (followed by UNAMID)	AU Mission in Sudan	Sudan	1/06/2004	2004	2007
ONUB (SCR 1545)	UN Operation in Burundi	Burundi	1/06/2004	2004	2006
UNAMIS (SCR 1547)	UN Advance Mission in Sudan	Sudan	1/06/2004	2004	2005
UNAMI (SCR 1500)	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq	Iraq	1/08/2003	2005	- to present
UNMIS (SCR 1590)	UN Mission in Sudan	Sudan	24/03/2005	2005	2008
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros	Comoros	30/03/2006	2006	2006
UNAMID (SCR 1769)	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan (Darfur)	31/10/2007	2007	- to present
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi	Burundi	1/01/2007	2007	- to present
UNMIN (SCR 1740)	UN Mission in Nepal	Nepal	23/01/2007	2007	2008

BINUCA (SCR 2031)	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	2011	2011	- to present
Operation Copper	Anti-piracy patrol in the Mozambique Channel	Mozambique Channel	2011	2011	- to present

Brazil's Contributions to multilateral missions and operations since 2003

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Mission name</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Start date of mission</b>	<b>Year of contribution</b>	<b>End of contribution</b>
UNTAET (SCR 1272)	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	Timor-Leste	25/10/1999	1999	2002
UNMISET (SCR 1410)	UN Mission of Support in East Timor	Timor-Leste	01/05/2002	2002	2005
UNMA (SCR 1433)	UN Mission in Angola	Angola	15/08/2002	2002	2003
UNMIK (SCR 1244)	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	Serbia and Montenegro(Kosovo)	13/06/1999	2003	2009
UNAMA (SCR 1401)	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	01/03/2002	2003	2010
Operation Artemis (CJA 2003/423/CFSP)	EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo (Democratic Republic of the, DRC)	1/06/2003	2003	2003
MINUCI (SCR 1479)	UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	01/05/2003	2003	- to present
UNMIL (SCR 1509)	UN Missions in Liberia	Liberia	1/10/2003	2003	- to present
MAPP/OEA (CP/RES. 859)	OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia	Colombia	01/02/2004	2007	- to present
MINUSTAH (SCR 1542)	UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti	Haiti	01/06/2004	2004	- to present
UNMIS (SCR 1590)	UN Mission in Sudan	Sudan	24/03/2005	2005	2011
UNAMI (SCR 1500)	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq	Iraq	01/08/2003	2005	- to present
UNMIT (SCR 1704)	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	Timor-Leste	25/08/2006	2005	- to present



UNMEE (SCR 1312)	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Eritrea, Ethiopia	1/07/2000	2006	2008
MINURSO (SCR 690)	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	Western Sahara	01/09/1991	2007	- to present
UNMIN (SCR 1740)	UN Mission in Nepal	Nepal	23/01/2007	2007	2010
MINURCAT (SCR 1778)	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	Central African Republic, Chad	25/09/2007	2008	- to present
UNFICYP (SCR 186)	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Cyprus	27/03/1964	2009	- to present
UNIFIL (SCR 425 & 426)	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Lebanon	01/03/1978	2010	- to present

**Annex E: Common Framework for Brazil and South Africa's partnering with the EU in Security and Defence**

**COMMON THEMES**

- political system
- shared values and principles
- promotion of good governance and human rights
  - commitment to multilateralism
  - existing strategic partnerships
- 'comprehensive approach' towards addressing root causes of conflicts
  - interoperable military equipment

**COMMON GEOGRAPHIC INTERESTS**



- <sup>1</sup> Obama statement before NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit: "We would like to see Europe have much more robust capabilities. That's not something we discourage." See: Toby Harnden, 'Barack Obama says Europe should not look to US as defence patron' The Daily Telegraph, April 3 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/5101682/Barack-Obama-says-Europe-should-not-look-to-US-as-defence-patron.html>
- <sup>2</sup> Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard, 'The EU's strategic partnerships with the BRIC: Where is the Strategy?', *BEPA monthly brief - Issue 29*, 2009, p. 7
- <sup>3</sup> See Council of the European Union, *A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy*, Brussels 12 December 2003. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> and *Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy*, Brussels 11 December 2008. Available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)
- <sup>4</sup> Basil Liddel Hart, *Strategy : the indirect approach* (London: Faber ;1967) p .335
- <sup>5</sup> Contribution to Operation Artemis in 2003
- <sup>6</sup> Michael Howard, *The Causes of War* (London: Counterpoint, 1984), p.36.
- <sup>7</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (London: Everyman's Library, 2003), p.87.
- <sup>8</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard UP, 1980) p.5
- <sup>9</sup> John Stone, *Military Strategy. The politics and technique of war* (London: Continuum, 2011), pp.5-8.
- <sup>10</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, p.17.
- <sup>11</sup> Francisco López-Alvez, 'Political crises, strategic choices, and terrorism: the rise and fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol.1, no.2 (1989), p.204
- <sup>12</sup> M.L.R. Smith and John Stone, 'Explaining Strategic Theory', *Infinity Journal*, Issue 4 (2011), p. 27
- <sup>13</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Choice and Consequence*, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard UP, 1980), p.200.
- <sup>14</sup> Giovanni Grevi, 'Making EU strategic partnerships effective', *Working Paper N°105*, FRIDE, 2010, p. 2
- <sup>15</sup> Council of the European Union, *A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.13. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>
- <sup>16</sup> Marius Vahl, 'Just good friends? The EU-Russian "strategic Partnership" and the Northern dimension', *CEPS Working document N°166*, 2001, p. 4
- <sup>17</sup> Giovanni Grevi, 'Why EU strategic partnerships matter?', *ESPO Working Paper No.1*, FRIDE – Egmont, June 2012, p. 7. Available at: <http://www.fride.org/publication/1031/why-eu-strategic-partnerships-matter> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>18</sup> Council of the European Union, *A secure Europe in a better world*, p. 14
- <sup>19</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing security in a changing world*, S407:08, Brussels 11 December 2008, p. 11. Available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)
- <sup>20</sup> Giovanni Grevi, 'Making EU strategic partnerships effective', p. 2
- <sup>21</sup> The Fifth BRICS Summit Declaration and Action Plan is available at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21482> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>22</sup> Prior to the consolidation of the BRICS group, with the admission of South Africa in December 2010, it was the IBSA dialogue forum which brought together Brazil, South Africa and India under the spirit of enhanced south-south cooperation since 2003. Indeed, it was within the Trilateral Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum that these countries expressed their intentions of playing more active role as international security actors, and pressed for the need to revise, for example, the structure of the United Nations Security Council. Currently, the IBSA forum is overshadowed by the BRICS.
- <sup>23</sup> This paper takes into account the third draft of the Defence Review as released on 10 April 2013. South Africa's Defence Review will be finalised by the end of the financial year, but the broad content of the drafts will surely remain substantially the same. Full chapters of The Defence Review are available at: <http://www.sadefencereview2012.org/publications/publications.htm>
- <sup>24</sup> See the speech: Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Honourable Ms Lindiwe Sisulu for the release of the Draft 2012 Defence Review, document for public comment, CSIR, Pretoria, 12 April 2012. Available at: [http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/media\\_statements/2012/apr/2012DefenceReview.htm](http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/media_statements/2012/apr/2012DefenceReview.htm) (Accessed 3 April 2013)
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Speech by Hon Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, RSA Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, 19 Feb. 2013 [http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/media\\_statements/2013/national\\_assembly%20.pdf](http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/media_statements/2013/national_assembly%20.pdf) (Accessed 10 April 2013)
- <sup>27</sup> Third Draft of the South African Defence Review 2012/13 DD, 10 April 2013, Chapter 4, §13 p. 4-4 §13
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., Chap. 8, §16, p. 8-4
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., Chap. 8, §32a, p. 8-7
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., Chap. 8, §12c, p. 8-3,
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., Chap. 8, §10, p. 8-2,
- <sup>33</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, (Oxford: OU Press, 2011), p. 20
- <sup>34</sup> Bérangère Rouppert, 'La hausse des dépenses militaires des BRICS : menace pour la sécurité ou aubaine pour l'industrie européenne de l'armement', *Note d'analyse*, GRIP, 22 June 2012, p. 9 Available at : [http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES\\_ANALYSE/2012/NA\\_2012-06-22\\_FR\\_B-ROUPPERT.pdf](http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2012/NA_2012-06-22_FR_B-ROUPPERT.pdf) (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>35</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*, (Oxford: OU Press, 2012),, p. 176
- <sup>36</sup> Third Draft South African Defence Review, Chap. 15, §2, p. 15-1,
- <sup>37</sup> 'SA Defence industry wants to be part of BRICS', Defence Web, 27 March 2013, Available at: [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=29971:sa-defence-industry-wants-to-be-part-of-brics&catid=7:Industry&Itemid=116](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29971:sa-defence-industry-wants-to-be-part-of-brics&catid=7:Industry&Itemid=116) / (Accessed: 13 March 2013)
- <sup>38</sup> Ministério da Defesa Nacional, Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, Brasil, 2012, p. 27 Available at: <https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/lbndn.pdf>
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 53
- <sup>40</sup> Celso Amorim, 'Estrategia de defensa de Brasil y de América del Sur', *Revista de Ciencia Política*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, vol.32 no.2, Santiago, 2012 Available at: [http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-090X2012000200008&script=sci\\_arttext](http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-090X2012000200008&script=sci_arttext)
- <sup>41</sup> Brazil signed partnerships with the southern cone's common market (MERCOSUR) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as bilateral cooperation agreements with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU).
- <sup>42</sup> See: 'Governing Brazil – Entrevista concedida a Brazil Confidential (6-8 Janeiro de 2012), Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/ministro-estado-relacoes-exteriores/governing-brazil> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>43</sup> Christina Stolte, 'Brazil in Africa: Just Another BRICS Country Seeking Resources?', *Chatham House – Briefing Paper*, November 2012. Available at: [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/1112bp\\_brazilafrika.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/1112bp_brazilafrika.pdf) (Accessed 11th April 2013)
- <sup>44</sup> Livro Branco, p. 34
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.54
- <sup>46</sup> Literally, the White Book reads: "O Brasil entende que os limites são claros: as missões de paz não podem substituir as partes de um conflito. A ONU ajudará a sustentar a paz que as partes venham a construir, devendo fazê-lo de modo estritamente imparcial, para que mantenha sua legitimidade e amplie seu valor político." See: Livro Branco, p.33
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>48</sup> See public statement of the Permanent Mission of South Africa at the UN: 'South Africa at the United Nations Security Council', Available at: <http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/SAatUNSC2011.html> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>49</sup> Franco-British Summit Joint declaration on European Defence, St Malo Declaration, 4 December 1998. Available at: <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>50</sup> See the EEAS statement: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/> (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>51</sup> Direct impact implying threat to EU Member States' interests and assets in these regions, immigration flows towards Europe, and illegal trafficking of narcotics and weapons.
- <sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, *A secure Europe in a better world*, p 10
- <sup>53</sup> ISIS Europe, *ISIS Parliamentary Update (SEDE Subcommittee)* 28/11/12. Available at: [http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/SEDE%20Committee%2028.11.12%20FD\\_0.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/SEDE%20Committee%2028.11.12%20FD_0.pdf) (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>54</sup> These countries include: Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Ukraine, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Serbia, US. See: [www.lrv.lt/bylos/.../Renginiai/2013-02-28%20vilnius%20seminar.ppt](http://www.lrv.lt/bylos/.../Renginiai/2013-02-28%20vilnius%20seminar.ppt) (Accessed 14 march 2013)
- <sup>55</sup> See official press release from the EU: EU-BRAZIL Summit. (Brasilia, Brazil, 24 January 2013) EU strategic partnership with Brazil. Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-13-17\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-17_en.htm) (Accessed 13 April 2013)
- <sup>56</sup> Quoted in: Matias Spektor, 'Brazil: The underlying ideas of Regional Policies', in: Daniel Flemes (ed.) *Regional Leadership in the Global System* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010). p. 201